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abstract There exists considerable research on how national
policy makers learn from abroad. A significant amount examines
the processes and actors at work at the international level. In
that strand, relatively little attention has gone to international
governmental organizations (IGOs), aside from the European
Union (EU)’s Open Method of Coordination. In this article, we
carry out a comparative study of learning in three IGOs: the
EU, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, and the Nordic Council of Ministers. Our policy
area is social protection. We investigate what is being learned,
and the factors that promote or block learning. Our
methodology involves an analysis of the formal design of those
IGOs and face-to-face interviews with high-ranking bureaucrats
from each organization. We observe, first, that the most
important learning in IGOs concerns matters that are not part
of formal agendas – governance and epistemic issues above all.
Second, we see that very different factors promote or block
learning in different organizations. We reflect on the
implications of these findings for both theory and practice.
keywords epistemic communities, governance, international
governmental organizations, policy learning, social protection
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Introduction
Globalization entails, among other things, increases in the information that
flows across nation states (Hopper, 2007; Tomlinson, 1999). This has helped
national policy makers in any one country learn about how their counterparts
elsewhere approach problems and formulate solutions (Dolowitz and Marsh,
1996; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 6–7; Stone, 2002). Research on learning
from abroad has accordingly burgeoned. A good amount has focused on those
national-level factors that promote the adoption of policy concepts from the
outside. A second major strand has concerned the international arena, with
special attention going to the impact of expert networks, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and pressures stemming from participation in the
global economy.
Much less has been said, however, about international governmental organ-
izations (IGOs). Scholars developed considerable insights in the 1960s (Martin
and Simmons, 1998). But today most of the attention is focused on one case –
the European Union (EU)’s OpenMethod of Coordination (OMC) – with the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the
World Bank only very recently coming under serious scrutiny. This is surpris-
ing: many IGOs involve senior policy makers from the member states and are
explicitly designed to promote learning.We should knowmore about learning
in those organizations. Two questions in particular require exploration: what
do the member states learn when they participate in IGOs? And what factors
promote or block that learning?
In this article, we investigate those questions in three very different IGOs
in the area of social protection: the EU (and the OMC in particular), the
OECD, and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM). All three organiza-
tions have units active in social protection. We examine first the formal
design of those organizations. We then present data from several intensive,
semi-structured interviews with high-ranking bureaucrats in the three IGOs.
Existing studies of IGOs rely almost inevitably on the perceptions and
reports of national policy makers, or evidence of convergence in national
policies. They also focus primarily on policy content. We believe that the
institutional positions and tenure of senior bureaucrats can provide us with
great insights into the learning process, especially when it comes to issues
beyond policy content.
The findings are intriguing. As to ‘what’ is being learned, the formal design
of the three IGOs places, as one might expect, an emphasis on learning about
the content of social protection policy and suggests that structured exchanges
of information lead to significant learning. However, in line with organiza-
tional theories of ‘decoupling’ (Meyer and Scott, 1983), which emphasize the
difference between the formal design and mission of organizations and what
actually happens there, our respondents reported otherwise. In their view, the
most important learning is around governance (e.g. how to bring about and
manage new policies) and unfamiliar epistemes (e.g. alternative ways of
understanding and making sense of the world).
As to what factors promote or block learning, the same respondents offered
remarkably different perspectives. In the EU’s OMC, the proper use of expert
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networks and careful diplomacy before public meetings and the release of
official publications are especially important. In the OECD more forceful
practices – such as public rankings of countries’ policies – are useful. In the
NCM, ensuring inclusiveness and exposure to the rigors of global competi-
tion are especially important. As a whole, these answers confirm construc-
tivist, coercive, facilitation-oriented, and competition-centered theories of
policy learning (Dobbin et al., 2007).
This article is organized as follows. We begin by discussing what we cur-
rently know about nation states learning from abroad. We then introduce our
three case studies – the EU, OECD, and NCM – and their formal missions in
the area of social protection. We follow by presenting the findings from our
in-depth interviews. In the conclusion, we reflect on the theoretical and prac-
tical implications of our findings.
Learning from Abroad: What Do We Know?
Nation states learn from beyond their borders. The improvement and refine-
ment of national policies in a variety of areas – from social policy to science,
technology, economics, and beyond – partly depends on it (Stone, 1999: 53).
Researchers have accordingly spent considerable time discovering what pro-
motes such learning and, to a lesser extent, what is actually being learned.
Their findings are captured under various headings besides policy learning,
such as policy transfer, policy diffusion, lesson-drawing, and even institutional
transplantation and policy bandwagoning (Dobbin et al., 2007; Stone, 1999).
Scholars have focused on either the ‘domestic’ or ‘international’ variables
affecting learning (De Jong and Edelenbos, 2007: 690; Stone, 1999: 52). We
examine both strands here.
DOMESTIC LEVEL
The earliest works on policy learning were concerned with the domestic con-
text. Learning was seen as a rather insulated affair, with the debate focusing
on the role of political elites, the structure of the state, the media, and politi-
cal parties (Hall, 1993; Oliver and Pemberton, 2004). But learning can of
course happen in response to data and information that come from outside a
country. Much recent research has focused on those domestic factors that
facilitate and shape the absorption of such data and information.
Evidence suggests, for instance, that political parties are acutely aware of
the ideologies and programs of their counterparts in other countries. When
convenient and appropriate, they borrow insights for the purposes of domestic
policy making. This seems to have happened most clearly in Central and
Eastern Europe, where communist successor parties have carefully studied
the social-democratic parties of Western European countries for insights
(Hough, 2005; Paterson and Sloam, 2005: 42).
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Networks of experts in a given country have also played a major role in
learning from abroad. Situated in academic institutions, think tanks, consult-
ing organizations, and other settings, these experts are ‘plugged’ into, and also
shape, international epistemic communities. They are then able to translate
for domestic consumption foreign ideas and information. The transfer is
often rather informal and can even occur across policy sectors – as happened,
for instance, in Great Britain when the government introduced evidence-
based practice in the education field in the 1990s following principles found
in Canada’s medical community (Hulme, 2006).
Many other variables play a role. These include national political culture,
business-state relations (Grüning et al., 2008), the choice of policy instru-
ments (Howlett and Ramesh, 1993), knowledge resources (databases, reports,
experts, etc.) (Biegelbauer, 2007), and the presence and activities of think
tanks and other institutions (Stone, 2002). We could discuss all of these at
length. But we can easily see the merits of these sorts of works: they help us
understand the permeability of nation states, the multiplicity of venues
through which outside data and information can shape policy making, and the
international dimensions of domestic policies.
We can also see, however, their limitations. Nation states are not only
‘open’ to the outside world but also heavily influenced by outside agents and
processes. A proper understanding of learning from abroad requires an under-
standing of those forces.
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Scholars now recognize that a number of factors operating at the international
level shape what and how nation states learn from outside their confines. Most
of the attention has gone to those factors which influence or put pressure on –
but do not rely on the direct participation of – national policy makers.
We know, for instance, quite a bit about how international non-govern-
mental organizations (INGOs) contribute to learning. INGOs are typically
highly organized and normative in their stance. They have resources, power,
and agenda. As such, they shape learning in a variety of ways, ranging from
the distribution of useful data to public shaming, lobbying, funding, consult-
ing, and the articulation of a global discourse on key issues. They often turn
to governments directly, but they also reach other INGOs, IGOs, and private
and public organizations (Christensen, 2006; Gordenker and Weiss, 1996:
17–18). Examples include Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and the
International Planned Parenthood Federation.
International networks of experts also play a major role in the learning
process. Far less institutionalized and programmatic than INGOs, these
networks typically involve informal or semi-formal connections among
individuals with extensive knowledge of particular issue areas. They provide
national policy makers with qualified, technical, and supposedly unbiased data
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about policy issues, indicators, and solutions. And they actively shape discourses
around key policy topics (De Jong and Edelenbos, 2007; Haas, 1992: 2; Stone,
2004; Yeates 2008).
There are then more systemic-level variables influencing national policy
makers. Perhaps the most important is the global economy and the ‘lessons’
that can be learned by way of exposure to competition and the international
marketplace, comparative data on performance, and increased external
scrutiny (Meissner, 2002; Sinn and Ochel, 2003).
All of these works help us see that international forces shape how nations
learn from abroad. But they share one limitation: a view of national policy
makers as domestically situated ‘targets’ of foreign pressure or ‘recipients’ of
data and information from the outside. In reality matters are quite different.
Policy makers participate directly in international forums and spaces. The
most obvious and possibly important are IGOs. Many IGOs are forums for
bargaining, negotiations, and policy making. Some are at least explicitly
designed to encourage learning. Most, if not all, contribute to learning in
some form or another (Checkel, 2005). As observed by perhaps the two most
prominent theorists of policy learning, ‘international governing organizations
(IGOs), such as the OECD, G-7, IMF and the UN and its various agencies,
are increasingly playing a role in the spread of ideas, programs and institu-
tions around the globe’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 11). What do we know,
then, about policy learning in IGOs?
Research on the EU and, in particular, the OMC has been significant.
The OMC is a non-compulsory process launched in the 1990s where, with
the help of the European Commission especially, member states share
domestic experiences in selected policy areas, agree to adopt certain indica-
tors and language for measurements and policy making, showcase their
accomplishments, and more. Some researchers believe little learning
happens in the OMC (Hatzopoulos, 2007). But many argue otherwise –
pointing as evidence to national reports, the evolution of particular policies,
the modus operandi of the OMC, and interviews with national officials
(Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005).
We know comparatively less, instead, about learning in other IGOs. If we
turn to one of the most established learning-oriented IGO – the OECD – we
find that most of the attention has gone to the organization’s ability to impose
on the member states its vision of the world (Armingeon and Beyeler, 2003;
Lehtonen, 2007). Most analysts reach the conclusion that countries ignore
the OECD’s recommendations (Lehtomen, 2007; Peters, 1997). A similar
preoccupation with power informs a recent wave of analyses of the IMF, the
World Bank, and the United Nations (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004;
Vetterlein, 2007;Woods, 2006). But imposition is not the same thing as learning.
At best, it can lead to learning. The same can be said of ‘socialization’ – another
topic of recent research on IGOs ( Johnston, 2008; Lewis, 2005).
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The few, though increasing, studies that do focus on learning in IGOs have
important limitations. Some simply report that little useful learning is taking
place (Schäfer, 2006). Others disagree (Studlar, 2006). However, their emphasis
is on policy content above all: on the policy ideas that nation states may or
may not find useful when devising domestic policies (Deacon 2007; Mahon
and McBride 2008; Orenstein 2008; Yeates 2008). Learning, of course, is
about policy content but also much else. These studies say little about what,
besides content, national policy makers may be learning from each other, and
what, exactly, may be promoting or blocking such learning.
Third, and crucially, most of these works rely for evidence on interviews
with national representatives, published national or IGOs’ reports, and
data on policy convergence across countries.1 This is sound methodologi-
cal practice. Yet, it leaves out of the picture some of the most valuable
sources of insights: senior IGO officials in charge of policy units designed
to encourage information and data sharing across nation states. These offi-
cials enjoy a privileged perspective: they normally have far more years of
experience than national representatives, are expected to promote learning
rather than advance a particular national view, and have a holistic view of
their organization.
The conclusion is clear: we still know quite little about the learning that is
happening in IGOs, despite the fact that this is where national policy makers
come into direct contact with each other. In the next section, we address this
problem by turning to the case of social protection in three IGOs.
Learning about Social Protection in the EU, OECD, and NCM
The number of IGOs – now well over 1000 – has grown steadily since the end
ofWorldWar II. The increase is all the more impressive when we observe that
many IGOs have actually vanished in that same time period (Shanks et al.,
1996). In the following pages, we investigate learning about social protection
in the EU’s OMC, the OECD, and the NCM. In line with recent method-
ological discussions about case studies selection in the social sciences (Bennett
and Elman, 2007; Gerring, 2004; Odell, 2004), we chose these three IGOs for
two reasons. All three organizations are explicitly designed to promote learn-
ing across the member states in important policy areas. If any learning happens
in IGOs, this is where we are most likely to find it and subject it to analysis.
These are, then, three ‘intrinsically important’ case studies (Odell, 2004).
Second, as Table 1 shows, the three organizations differ from each other in
terms of size, age, homogeneity of membership, and objectives. This diversity –
which follows ‘the method of difference’ logic – will ensure that our findings
have more relevance than if we selected very similar organizations.
We turned to social protection. All three organizations have units dedicated
to learning in that policy area. Yet, even in the case of the OMC, we know
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remarkably little about what national representatives are learning. Figure 1
situates those units in their broader institutional context.
We followed a two-step approach in our investigation. First, we examined
the formal design of those units. At the official level, what sort of data and
information are those units helping national representatives share with each
other? And through what means are they trying to achieve this? We answered
these questions by examining those units’ programs, structures, and outputs.
Our second step was to conduct semi-structured, face-to-face, extended
interviews with the leaders of each social policy unit. Learning is a process,
and formal analysis of organizations cannot yield much valuable information
about what actually happens inside those organizations. In-depth, on the ground
qualitative investigations can prove fruitful (Odell, 2004).We approached our
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table 1 EU, OECD, and NCM: Basic differences
IGO Size Year founded Homogeneity Objectives
EU (OMC) 27 1997 Mixed: all 27 EU Convergence of policies
member states toward best practice
among the member states
in various policy areas
OECD 30 1961 Low: Countries as Sustainable economic
different as the growth
United States,
Turkey, and Mexico
NCM 5 1953 High: Denmark, Policy coordination and
Finland, Norway, adoption of common
Sweden, and Iceland stances toward the
external world
European Union
European Commission
Director General for
Employment, Social Affairs,
and Equal Opportunities
OMC - Social Protection
Committee
OECD
Social Policy Division
Directorate for Employment,
Labour, and Social Affairs
OECD Secretariat
NCM
Committees and Working
Groups
Nordic Committee for
Cooperation
Nordic Committee on
Health and Social Affairs
figure i Social protection in the EU, OECD, and NCM
interviewees in 2008 with 14 initial questions,2 all of which clustered around
what member states learn from participating in each IGO, and what factors
seem especially important for, or harmful to, such learning.
In the case of the OMC, we interviewed the former leader of the Social
Protection Committee, since he held that job for two years, and the current
leader (who was in place for less than two months). In the case of the OECD,
we interviewed the longtime head of the Social Policy Division. As for the
NCM, we interviewed the head of the Nordic Committee on Health and
Social Affairs but also a senior advisor, given her prominent role in the learn-
ing process. These were the most senior officials overseeing and managing
the everyday operations of those units, enjoying a continuous and long-term
exposure to the learning process unmatched by anyone else there. Figure 2
identifies our interviewees.
We report first on the formal design of the social protection units of the
OMC, OECD, and NCM.
Formal Design and Learning about Social Protection
The programs, activities, and outputs of the social protection units of the
EU’s OMC, OECD, and NCM make one thing clear: learning is about
policy content. The units help national officials learn about the laws and
administrative programs in place in the various member states. At the same
time, there are important differences in the mechanisms used for promoting
learning. The OMC and OECD rely extensively on published materials:
reports, documents, white papers, presentations, and more. The NCM, by
contrast, operates on a more interpersonal level: publications are very few
and ad hoc, meetings and conferences are very frequent. Let us consider
each unit in turn.
The OMC was born out of the Lisbon process in 1997 and applied origi-
nally to employment. It now covers several policy areas where traditional
community law cannot be used. Activities in the area of social protection
began in 2000, when the Social Protection Committee was created to promote
learning on pensions, health care, long-term care, poverty, housing, and more.
The goal is to identify best practices. This is done through four institutional
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R3-OECD:
Head of Social Policy
Division
R1-OMC:
Secretary to the Social
Protection Committee
R2-OMC:
Former Secretary to the Social
Protection Committee
R4-NCM:
Head of the Nordic Committee
on Health and Social Affairs
R5-NCM:
Senior Advisor
figure 2 Respondents (R) from the EU, OECD, and NCM
mechanisms, all of which make heavy use of publications to capture and
spread policy content.
Perhaps the most important mechanism involves the writing and dissemina-
tion of National Strategic Reports (NSRs) on social protection. Submitted by
national representatives every two years, the reports disclose each country’s
legislative approaches and frameworks, along with its progress towards achiev-
ing commonly agreed policy goals in responses to recommendations from the
EU.3 These are generally rich, detailed, and highly informative documents.
The European Commission and Council, in turn, issue Joint Reports (JRs)
where they offer deep analyses of domestic and foreign legislative frame-
works, evaluate national approaches, benchmark progress, and recommend
good practices. Well-designed laws from across the EU are set against weaker
laws. Strategies are examined, problems identified, and solutions suggested.
Like NSRs, JRs are made publicly available on the Internet upon publication.4
Peer Review Programs constitute a third learning venue. There is less reliance
on published materials and much more on live, personal interactions. The
focus remains, however, on policy content. The Social Protection Committee
selects, in consultation with the member states and the Commission, several
countries (eight in 2008, for example) that can boast ‘best practices’ in a
particular issue area and wish to host for a few days representatives of other
member states. During the visit, the host country’s policies and programs are
scrutinized, extended question-and-answer sessions held, and ideas exchanged.
Short reports on the visits are made available to the public.5
The fourth venue for learning in the OMC is somewhat different from the
others (Mabbett, 2007). The European Commission and Council, in collabo-
ration with the member states, produce a list of indicators: statistical tools,
ratios, and other numerical and qualitative measurements. Themember states
are expected to use those indicators when writing their NSRs and reporting
on progress towards commonly agreed objectives. Most reporting by the
Commission and Council must be done with those indicators in mind. The
focus continues to be best practices in policy terms. And the medium of com-
munication is still structured exchanges among the participants and published
documents. Yet, indicators are a step removed from content: they have more
to do with the development of a common terminology and language.6
Like the OMC, the OECD is formally about content. Its Social Policy
Division disseminates information about best policies for protecting vulnera-
ble segments of society. In the case of the OECD, however, the ultimate goal
is ensuring sustainable, dynamic economic growth. This determines the spe-
cific types of policies that come under scrutiny. The promising increases in
productivity among vulnerable segments of the population – through higher
participation rates in the workforce or training, for instance – are of special
interest. Hence, the focus of a major recent report on disabled people was on
ways to remove disincentives to work and improve labor market activation
(OECD, 2003: 3).
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The Social Policy Division relies heavily on published materials to spread
information and data about best practices. In this way, too, it resembles the
OMC’s Social Protection Committee. The three most important initiatives
at the moment –MakingWork Pay (aimed at unemployment), pension system
monitoring, and the development of useful social indicators – are all centered
around publications.7 Much the same can be said about past initiatives. Most
publications, in turn, have a quantitative flavor, in line with the economic
outlook of the organization: tables, rankings, and graphs abound.
The NCM is also content-driven: national officials are encouraged to learn
about policies and approaches in place in the member states. Here social pro-
tection appears as one of 10 policy areas (the others include fisheries, food,
gender, the environment, energy, health, and the labor market). The Council
of Ministers for Health and Social Affairs is in charge.8 But the goal of the
NCM, in social protection and elsewhere, is rather different. Recall that that
the OMC and OECD are about best practices. There, hierarchies are estab-
lished. Some policies are hailed while others are disregarded. By contrast, the
NCM is much more about cooperation and coordination – about finding a
communal, ‘Nordic’ approach to problems: what can be done at the regional
level to address more effectively issues around pensions, unemployment, or
disability? What position should the Nordic countries take in negotiations in
international forums such as the EU or the World Health Organization?
What is the future of the Nordic model in social protection (Nordic Council
of Ministers, 2007)? All this is consistent with a long history of efforts to
increasemutual understanding, rather than uniformity, among the Scandinavian
countries (Petersen, 2006).
These objectives shape the institutional practices theNCM relies upon at the
formal level to foster policy content learning. Substantive publications are ad
hoc and typically outsourced to supporting institutions (such as the Nordic
Council for Alcohol and Drug Research). ‘Discussion papers’ rather than top-
down reports from senior officials are most common. There are no regular
country reports, comparative assessments, or rankings.Much is made of in-per-
son meetings. Biannual conferences among national representatives, coupled
with ongoing communication via phone or electronic mail with ministerial
delegates, is the preferred method of information and data dissemination.
Our analysis of the formal design of the OMC, OECD, and NCM’s social
protection units can only yield a partial picture of the actual learning that
takes place in everyday life. Much more often happens within and beyond that
design. We turned to IGO officials for their insights.
Perspectives of Senior Bureaucrats
As to ‘what’ is learned in IGOs about social protection, our interviewees agreed
that, while the formal focus is on policy content, the most valuable learning
concerns issues not on official agendas. The same interviewees differed
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remarkably when discussing the factors that promote or block learning. We
discuss each matter in turn.
WHAT DO THE MEMBER STATES LEARN FROM EACH OTHER?
Sociologists have argued for quite some time that there exists a difference
between the formal rules and objectives governing organizations and
everyday reality. They refer to ‘decoupling’ to describe the way in which
everyday activities in an organization depart from the formal structures
that are supposed to guide them. The process is often inevitable, as those
structures tend to conform to idealized principles of organizational design
that cannot ensure efficiency and the fulfillment of actual objectives
(Meyer and Rowan, 1991: 57–8).
When it comes towhatmember states learn in theOMC,OECD, andNCM,
our respondents agreed that what is officially discussed in those IGOs – policy
content – is important. Yet, all of our respondents made clear that some of the
most valuable learning concerns issues and matters that do not figure promi-
nently in the official programs, activities, and outputs of those IGOs. ‘The
process of mutual learning’, R1 from the OMC told us, ‘is going on on a daily
basis … even from the capitals … during the days between one meeting and
another’. R2 from theOMCput is as follows: ‘after all, we really are a platform…
when we publish a report … we do it with the purpose of facilitating the
exchange between member states. So, if member states take the cue from the
report and they pick up the phone and just call their counterparts in another
member state … that is the kind of things we try to make happen’ (R2–OMC).
R3 from the OECD explained how ‘a lot happens at the edges … we always
make sure we have big coffee breaks. You have some sort of social event at the
end; you don’t make the meeting last more than, say, six hours a day; absolutely
no’. What, then, do the member states learn in those instances and contexts?
They learn about governance. Governance is not about the content of poli-
cies but about how to make and then implement those policies. It is the art of
getting things done by managing various stakeholders, understanding what
can and cannot be accomplished in a given policy and institutional environ-
ment, and making effective choices. This is what national representatives are
eager to know more about and are in fact learning from each other – but that
cannot be easily discussed in open forums. As R2 told us in a statement that
undermines the entire formal OMC process, the ‘member states do not need
to know that the way to deal with a pension crisis is such, such, and such. They
have well-informed people in their ministries’. They take something else
from the OMC instead:
… the implementing side [of things]: how do you deal with difficulties at various
political levels, regional levels … how do you deal with overlapping authorities? …
How do you deal with your counterparts in the treasury? … I think that the mem-
ber states, at least the representatives of member states, I have been in contact with
are very much interested in these practical questions – the governance side, if you
will. (R2–OMC)
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Member states, R2 continued, wish to gain insights into ‘how do you make it
happen? I think that is where there is most interest. That is my understand-
ing of the work we did reviewing the OMC last year’. They wish to know how
to position policy ideas for public acceptance, overcome skepticism and dis-
sent, and generate positive momentum.
R3 from the OECD echoed this view. As he put it, ‘if you ever came to an
OECD meeting … You know we have a great, huge [report] with maybe an
hour and a half discussion – an hour and a half sounds quite long – that’s 30
countries. I mean none of them are going to say anything very deep’. What
they learn, instead, is about subtler and more practical questions: ‘did you
compensate the losers? Did you package this reform with something else at
the same time?’ (R3–OECD). Successful policy making requires overcoming
opposition, and the OECD affords national representatives with a chance to
learn about how that is done.
At the same time, governance is also about knowing what can and cannot be
tackled at a particular point in time. It is about timing and deciding that some-
thing should and can be done. Thus, in the OECD Social Policy Division at
least, member states learn about ‘actually getting the confidence to do some-
thing, because other countries are doing something’. National representatives
learn the limits of the possible, or, as our interviewee put it, ‘what can you get
away with?’ (R3–OECD). Learning, then, is not about content, but about
when and how to make choices.
The second major area of learning concerns the articulation and absorption
of a language for thinking about the world. Societal problems do not simply
exist but require identification and definition. Words help us see the contours
and internal qualities of issues and problems. They establish limits and
boundaries but also enable us to mobilize against what needs fixing. Learning
here concerns the fundamental building blocks behind policies. R3 from the
OECD described this process as follows:
What we’re doing is find a way to talk about policies using the same terms, creat-
ing, using the same forms of analysis, so that people can compare across countries,
and building some sort of support network for officials, so that when they do think
something is, what the minister’s proposing is wrong, that they can actually either
ring us up or ring other people, that they know from the OECD to say, what did
you do, how did you deal with this? … I think, when [the academics] start talking
about creation of epistemic communities, it rings a bell in this area. (R3–OECD)
R2 from the OMC had similar reflections:
An episteme … an epistemic agreement – really in the end we all speak the same
language. And that in itself is a very good result … this is really an epistemic frame-
work that we share. But it’s a ‘we,’ it’s not just effort by the Commission, it’s also an
effort by the Council, you know ... When you ask them [national officials], what do
you appreciate about the OMC, it’s not the quality of our drafting, of our report or
even the structure. It’s the fact that it’s a permanent dialogue. (R2–OMC)
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NCM officials did not explicitly refer to the formation of epistemic
communities. But they certainly depicted their organization as a forum where
worldviews are shared and participants’ perspectives on issues and problems
merge to a degree. As R4 from NCM put it, ‘we are kind of a mixed melting
pot of all the differences in the different countries’. In the NCM, countries
are developing ‘like-minded views on … matters’. They are not learning
about policies, but about the ideas behind the policies. This is of course ‘not
usually on the formal agenda, but it’s kind of the informal information that
goes on during the meeting or at specific other points in time’ (R4–NCM).
This is what happened, for instance, during discussions over the launch of a
new Nordic institute for bird flu research:
We have over the past couple of years tried to put up or to investigate whether to put
up a common Nordic institution on producing vaccine for bird flu. We haven’t yet
succeeded in doing so, but the … work or the analyses that have been made in these
two years have given [us] a lot of information; a lot of common knowledge… so even
if we haven’t succeeded in getting the common facility, we have a lot of learning.
Behind official documents and processes, then, are more fundamental ideas
and viewpoints. R2 of the OMC invited us to think of his unit, the Social
Protection Committee, as:
… the tip of the iceberg. Think again of the example of [child poverty]. In the
[Joint Report] there is maybe two pages on child poverty; there’s one key message.
That’s really the most high level you can get. But in order to have [compelling]
messages, ok, it took a couple of meetings, but it also took this huge report by the
indicators subgroup. For doing that report they also had to exchange views and to
determine what are the best indicators to monitor child poverty … so there was
really a lot of mutual learning, because it was prepared of course by the secretary of
the SPC, but with a lot of cooperation from the member states.
Now, a number of factors shape the very nature of these epistemic commu-
nities. The very working language of an organization, for instance, is of much
importance. For instance, though the official working languages of the
OECD are French and English, only the latter is really used:
We are an Anglophone organization. That does limit the reach of our work in par-
ticular countries, and it means that we almost rely on the community, the epistemic
community, the academics, the government officials to actually sell our work
domestically. (R3–OECD)
Similarly, the specific mandate of the organization as well as the extent to
which it is able to push member states in new directions greatly influences
what frames, terminologies, and ideas national representatives are bound to
share. The NCM, for instance, can take significant initiatives: ‘our secretary
general has the privilege of putting up proposals. So this gives us … the pos-
sibility to take initiatives on our own and to forward them to the ministers or
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the senior official groups’ (R4–NCM). The same cannot be said for the
OMC – as R2 put it, ‘this is also the EU, so we work together with the member
states’ – but certainly for the OECD, though here the power of the USA poses
certain limits:
[There are] people who want to influence the discussions. So people who want to
determine what we work on in a much more vocal way than the other countries. All
countries obviously have a vote on what we do, but some will definitely try to take
the lead in trying to say that what we should be doing is the following. You know,
this is the paradigm we should be pushing.
I mean, if we can ever come to some sort of consensus about wording, that’s
extremely useful. Now in social policy for the OECD it’s much more difficult than
at the EU-level, and it’s bad enough at the EU-level. But for the OECD we have a
large elephant in the room, that goes by the name of the United States, that really
makes life difficult for us on social policy. And for the last eight years the view of
the United States is that the only social policy worth speaking about was promot-
ing marriage. (R3–OECD)
But variations in what shapes the specific episteme in a given IGO do not alter
our overall conclusion. Along with governance, in the minds of those who
lead the learning process around social protection in the OMC, OECD, and
NCM, the member states learn from each how other to frame, think, and talk
about problems and solutions. Learning concerns much less the ‘what’ and
much more the ‘how’ of policy making.
WHAT FACTORS PROMOTE OR BLOCK LEARNING ACROSS THE
MEMBER STATES?
Our respondents were especially interested in discussing the factors that pro-
mote or block learning in their organizations. Recent literature suggests that
policy makers take in ideas and information from outside in one of four ways
(Dobbin et al., 2007; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 11). The first – put forth by
constructivists – emphasizes that a few key actors (expert networks above all)
operating at the international level generate policy information and data.
National policy makers tap into those insights to craft their policies. The sec-
ond points to coercion: the ability of a few powerful players to have their world-
views imposed on others. Here, member states learn from other member
states or other organizations (the IMF, for instance) in forceful fashion.
Competition theorists point out that the rigors of global competition make
clear which national policy approaches are the best – i.e. most efficacious.
Quality matters more than power, as countries with poor approaches fail
and those with good ones succeed. The fourth and last school of thought
emphasizes the ease with which policy makers can access each other’s policy
data and information. Attention goes to those practices, rules, and techno-
logical advances which facilitate such access. Table 2 summarizes these four
schools of thought:
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Our interviewees offered answers that supported all four schools of thought.
But those answers varied dramatically across the three units. Moreover, they
identified a few key factors that defy current theoretical paradigms about
learning. We consider each unit in turn.
OMC
R1 and R2 from the OMC identified factors that strongly conform to the
constructivist and facilitation perspectives. On the constructivist front, much
emphasis was put on the role of national experts in supporting the OMC,
where they are made part of ‘subgroups’. Experts from the member states
help the OMC achieve precision and concreteness – all key ingredients to
achieving consensus:
Oh, subgroups are very important. I think … I’m a big fan, because I think that …
we would like to have the most solid framework … we are convinced that the more
concrete you are the easier it is to have an agreement with the member states. You
have to struggle for hours on a political document about adjectives and adverbs. If
you involve the real specialists from the member states, we can really have a break-
through … [their work] paves the way for political agreement within the commit-
tee … because you have all the steps of the reasoning … down.
R1 concurred with this stance:
I can confirm, that this [relying on experts] continues to be applied for sure, and
there was the launch of a new group, a new subgroup, last month. This is on active
inclusion issues. And this is again in order to have an in-depth discussion preparing
what will be the position of the SPC. And even in order to better prepare what
could be an integrated … so this is absolutely a way that is used and will be used.
At the same time, on the facilitation side, R1 and R2 openly emphasized that
good, impactful policy documents are possible only if potential opposition
and problems are resolved before the time of formal meetings and publica-
tions. OMC officials can play an enormous role in that regard:
Usually, when I was secretary, I used to call them [the member states] in advance,
just to clear things before [the meeting]. I think, it’s [a good way] to do it … To try
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table 2 Modes of learning
School of thought Key actors Process
Constructivism Expert networks, INGOs, Collaboration
interest groups
Coercion Powerful nations, organizations, groups Imposition
Competition Pressures from global economy Natural selection
Facilitation International organizations, technology Openness, access
out the ideas, before… Well, because I only have one meeting to get a document
adopted for the council. I really need that meeting to be productive. If I have 27 dif-
ferent opinions … I need to prepare not necessarily the agreement, but some sort
of shared understanding must be there from the beginning. Otherwise it would be
impossible. It would take forever. (R2–OMC)
The practice makes it possible not only to reach agreement before announce-
ments are made but also avoid embarrassing setbacks afterwards:
But I was not asking their permission, I was simply trying out ideas. How would
you react to this, and I was trying to find out, what was their position, and what
really do you object to in this commission communication? … You want to have
them engaged. Because nothing is more dangerous, if I can make an example, than
having someone shutting up for two meetings, and then coming up … or after the
meeting suddenly realizing what they have approved. (R2–OMC)
R1 and R2 thought little of coercive practices. They pointed out that there is
little pressure of consequence coming from the member states:
Of course this is an EU committee, and you can see the traditional clustering of
countries around the positions that you would expect. With France, Spain, Italy,
Portugal, Austria often on one side. Germany mostly concerned with subsidiarity
and the relationship with [the Länder] or things like that. It’s just part of everyday
politics. But no, at least in my tenure, I did not see any active push by some countries.
(R2–OMC)
R2 in turn insisted that the Social Protection Committee itself has little power
to force its viewpoints on the member states. ‘Everybody enjoys a little
power’, he said, ’but, no, I’m joking ... I mean, you can force maybe reforms,
but as you know, it doesn’t work all that well ... What we have in place here is
a totally voluntary process’.
Both respondents, finally, shared with us insights that do not neatly ‘fit’ with
the four theories on learning discussed above. The most salient had to do with
the mindset of national representatives. R2 spoke of ‘conceptual inclination’.
Sometimes themember states ‘are trying to learn… and to apply it to their own
context’. But in other cases ‘member states have a more defensive attitude’.
OECD
R3 provided us with remarkably different answers. He spoke about forceful
ways of ensuring that certain ideas from the member states are adopted or fall
out of circulation. ‘Countries’, he observed, ‘normally accept that they want
to be steered as well. I mean, this is partly the freedom of the OECD com-
pared to the European Union’. One venue for doing so is shaming by way of
ranking countries in terms of performance. This is a delicate process, of
course, but one that certainly works:
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The other thing that’s always terribly, terribly influential, and therefore used… are
league tables. We are generally …Well, you have to be careful with them. Clearly,
if we use league tables all the time, and say these countries are top, and these coun-
tries are bottom, the countries at the bottom are being given a problem that they
have to deal with. And as I say, we deal very much with the ministries – for good or
ill, that’s who we’re dealing with – if we start ranking a country to the bottom, we
are giving clients a problem. (R3–OECD)
Shaming can push policy leaders to look for inspiration beyond their
national borders. At the same time, it can also justify the decision of already-
committed leaders to borrow from other countries. Consider this statement:
‘a classic example is Germany and family policy. At the moment we can’t beat
them up enough. The more we are unpleasant and nasty to them about the
failure of their family policy the happier they are, because they want change,
so they need the publicity’ (R3–OECD).
The OECD is forceful in other ways, too. Countries otherwise closed to
others’ ideas can prove more open if the OECD threatens them with various
forms of retaliation. R3 described to us how the conservative Canadian gov-
ernment eventually changed its mind about early retirement schemes:
And there was nothing that the administration, the public officials, who violently
opposed to this – I mean they lived through all the problems of the early retirement
schemes in the past – that they could do to actually stop the government from being
extremely keen on early retirement. In the end, the thing that worked was Canada
wanted to host a ministerial meeting on employment, and the officials kept saying
to the minister ‘you’re going to be trying to do something diametrically opposed to
what the OECD says, and this is mad. You know, you’re going to get some bad press
on this’. And the minister backed down for that reason. (R3–OECD)
As to which countries are especially active in pushing for their perspectives to
be adopted, R3 had interesting revelations:
The Netherlands used to be very, very active … at the moment they’re less active
than they were. Another example would be Germany … historically has been very
inactive, but at the moment they’re going through an active phase [also] Australia…
Canada, Poland – that’s partly because we have a Polish chair at the moment, a very,
very good Pole at the moment … France always, pretty much always, UK usually
would be on that list, but it’s not at the moment … The Nordics are a bit more
complicated. (R3–OECD)
Not surprisingly, R3 had much less to say about facilitation as a way of pro-
moting learning. It could help, he noted, but the OECD was not in a good
position to make good use of it, given the perception that European countries
have of it as neoliberal and the USA often seeing it as too continental in
thought. R3 was in turn rather ambivalent about the contributions that
national experts can make to the learning process:
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Yes and no. I mean, as ever, as any international organization will tell you, the idea
of contracting out your work to outside experts is lovely in theory and horrible in
practice. They never quite deliver what you actually want … Also it is quite diffi-
cult to find academics who have a reasonable knowledge of more than a few num-
ber of countries. (R3–OECD)
When asked about competition and exposure to the global economy, R3
also expressed ambivalence:
Would we say that globalization forces you to do something? Not quite directly; it
would be much more that this is damaging to your labor market or this is very dis-
tortionary compared with other countries that you deal with, it’s probably not a
good idea … but you know, I do say that, but I sometimes do these broad sweeping
presentations about what’s happening to social policy and, yeah, globalization makes
an appearance in there. (R3–OECD)
R3 had then a number of intriguing insights into the learning process that
do not fall neatly under any existing theory of learning. Moments of crises,
such as the fall of the Soviet Union, offer powerful opportunities for signifi-
cant learning. Then, he said, the Eastern European countries ‘wanted to
learn’. But crises can also prevent officials from being open to new ideas. On
a more structural level, R3 felt that federal countries may be more open to
learning than unitary ones given that their national governments have typi-
cally fewer responsibilities on their shoulders and thus less at stake. New gov-
ernments are, in turn, often quite open to input. Finally, in areas where
significant new ideas have already been put into place (such as pension), offi-
cials are likely to be too exhausted to consider additional insights.
NCM
NCM officials spoke very highly of various facilitation techniques for pro-
moting learning among nation states. Inclusiveness and representation are
especially prized in the Nordic Committee on Health and Social Affairs.
Only then, officials feel, are national representatives exposed and open to
each others’ ideas:
We have this rule that there should always be at least three countries involved in a spe-
cific project. So that means that any given project will … have some kind of informa-
tion or learning process inherited. Also with our institutions [there is] a member from
each and every country … usually on the different working groups we also have …
people from all the countries … Sometimes also we do have the three autonomous
regions of Greenland, Faroe Islands, and the Åland Islands. (R4–NCM)
R5 shared this view:
We of course should and shall treat all countries equal, and we also know that on a
five-year basis the chairmanship of the Nordic cooperation changes. So if we go in
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a kind of special cooperation mode with one country against the rest, we know that
they will end up being our chairman in a few years to come, so there’s kind of a
check and balance.
But representation and inclusion can also have negative consequences. They
can slow down progress and limit what is being shared. As R4 put it:
The Nordic cooperation is based on consensus, so we very easily end up with the
smallest common denominator in any given question, so we have kind of to push
the limit somewhat in order to also push this common denominator being not the
absolute smallest.
NCM officials pointed to participation in the global market place as a sec-
ond major factor that is conducive to learning. The Nordic countries are
small with economies fully integrated at the international level. They are also
reliant on an expensive but also quite successful welfare model that ensures
fast retraining of the workforce, high levels of productivity, efficient labor
markets, and more. Exposure to the global economy has forced the member
states to evaluate carefully their approach – to entertain possibilities, to hear
each others’ ideas. As our interviewees put it:
Well, the premiers just met on … Monday … and I haven’t read the press release,
but I think, I know, it would state something like, that … the whole globalization
issue has been kind of the overall heading for a very large proportion of our activ-
ities … both from the social side and from science and business and climate and
whatever. (R4–NCM)
But … the whole approach is also to look at the possibilities … in terms of devel-
oping the Nordic welfare model. (R5–NCM)
Somewhat surprisingly, NCM officials had mixed views on the contribution
of experts. R5 was especially clear about this:
We have the expert groups. We have around twelve expert groups in the social and
health sector…But I would say that our expert groups are verymuch living their own
lives more or less. I mean, our communication with the expert group is very limited,
but we use them, if we need some proposals for activities within some specific areas.
At the same time – in line with the coercion hypothesis – NCM officials noted
that certain players try to influence both the amount and direction of the learn-
ing, though they said little about the extent to which those efforts bear fruit:
Norway, Sweden, and Finland … differ a little, but they’re very pro Nordic coop-
eration. And I would not say that Denmark is against it, but it seems to me … that
Denmark says that we have some very specific tasks that we want to be undertaken
on the Nordic level and nothing else … because some of these things are dealt with
in the EU, WTO, [etc.]. (R4–NCM)
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The Danish position on cooperation, in turn, is generally supported by
Iceland.
Important differences, then, set our respondents from the OMC, OECD,
and NCM apart. We reflect on their perspectives in the concluding section of
this article.
Discussion: Learning in IGOs
We investigated learning in three IGOs – the OMC, OECD, and NCM – in
the area of social protection. Our respondents were senior IGO bureaucrats
continuously involved with the learning process over long periods of time and
with an eye on all the member states. Two themes in particular emerged from
our research.
First, IGOs are, in fact, clearly valuable forums for learning about social
protection. At the formal level, national representatives do learn about each
others’ policies. But the senior officials running the relevant units made clear
that, consistent with organizational theories of ‘decoupling’, actual everyday
learning also happens rather informally and concerns not policy content but
‘governance’ and ‘epistemes’: how to get things done, and how to think about
problems and solutions. This is indeed what national representatives appreci-
ate and look for the most, and where our attention should go when examin-
ing learning in IGOs. And this is certainly something that those national
representatives cannot gather easily by exposure to INGOs, expert networks,
or simply examining from their domestic confines what ‘others’ are doing.
Second, the same respondents made clear that – in line but also beyond the
expectations of constructivist, coercive, facilitation-oriented, and competi-
tion-centered theories of policy learning – quite different factors promote or
block learning. OMC officials stressed the importance of expert networks and
facilitation techniques. They also underscored the role of open or closed
mindsets in the member states. The OECD official emphasized the impor-
tance of forceful guidance and imposition, as well as the impact of crises and
governmental structures. NCM officials mentioned facilitation, consensus
building, and exposure to the rigors of global competition.
Our findings generate three important implications for future research.
First, from a theoretical standpoint, we need more case studies to help us gen-
eralize about learning in IGOs when it comes to social policy but also beyond.
Our evidence concerns three case studies in the area of social protection only.
Moreover, the perspectives of our respondents, though very valuable, are lim-
ited. What, then, is happening in other IGOs? What would other stakehold-
ers think learning is about in the OMC, OECD, and the NCM? How are the
learning dynamics different in different policy areas?
Second, from a practical standpoint, we should explore in detail the possi-
bility of ‘best practice’ in IGOs – again in social policy but also beyond. Here
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the intention is to identify, among the various mechanisms that help learning,
those that are most efficient and effective. We also wish to know whether
somemechanisms work better in some contexts and not others. Are there par-
ticular institutional practices that are actually effective regardless of setting?
This would not only shed light on the learning process but also help bureau-
crats improve their organizations.
Finally, when it comes to practice again, we should reflect more on the
interesting split between formal structures and objectives, and what senior
bureaucrats think is actually happening on the ground on a daily basis. If
national representatives are above all eager to learn about governance and
epistemes, can something be done to further learning in those areas? Must
that learning always occur in the shadow or can it be brought to the fore, sup-
ported, and even expanded?
Our OMC interviewees told us of an Internet initiative they have launched
where policy makers share ideas about governance. It is an informal and care-
fully moderated space. It might serve as the basis for something more prom-
ising in the future. Our OECD respondent stressed that governance in
particular is often a politically sensitive subject matter. Perhaps creative ways
me be devised to capture and codify successful approaches without making
reference to specific countries or situations. The same may be said for matters
related to epistemic questions. Our discussions with the NCM respondents
reminded us that the basic tone and mission of an IGO – confrontational and
competitive, for instance, versus cooperative and inclusive – can make a dif-
ference for what participants are willing to share. Our point is straightfor-
ward: IGOs and their member states might wish to focus their learning efforts
more explicitly on governance issues and epistemic communities.
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notes
1. For an exception (on the OECD), see Lehtomen (2007) and Deacon and Kaasch
(2008).
2. The questionnaire is available upon request.
3. For reports on social protection from 2001 on, see: http://ec.europa.eu/employment
_social/spsi/strategy_reports_en.htm
4. For all JRs since 2002, see: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/joint_
reports_en.htm
5. For a description of the process and access to short reports, see: http://ec.europa.eu/
employment_social/spsi/peer_review_en.htm
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6. For details on indicators in social protection, see: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_
social/spsi/common_indicators_en.htm
7. For details on the OECD’s official program and activities in social protection, see:
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_33933_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
8. For details about the Nordic Council of Ministers for Health and Social Affairs, see
http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/council-of-ministers/
council-of-ministers-for-health-and-social-affairs-mr-s
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résumé
Apprentissage dans les Organismes Gouvernementaux
Internationaux: Le Cas de la Protection Sociale
Il y a beaucoup de recherche aux responsables des politiques à l’échelon national s’in-
spirer de l’expérience d’autres pays. Beaucoup des études examinent les processus et les
personnes qui travaillent au niveau international. Dans cette égard, relativement peu
d’attention est accordée pour organismes gouvernementaux internationaux (OGI),
sauf pour l’ ‘Open Method of Coordination’ de l’EU. Dans cette article, on fait une
étdue comparative pour l’apprentissage dans trois OGIs: l’EU, l’OECD, et le Conseil
de Ministres nordique. Notre domaine d’action est la protection sociale. On étudie les
connaissances acquises, et les facteurs qui favorisent ou bloquent l’apprentissage.
Notre méthodologie implique une analyse de la conception formelle de ces OGIs et
entrevues face à face avec des hauts fonctionnaires de chaque organisation. Premièrement,
on observe que l’apprentissage le plus important pour les OGIs concerne les sujets qui
sont indépendant des ordres du jour formels – le gouvernement et issues de l’episté-
mologie partout. Deuxiémement, nous voyons que les éléments très différents favorisent
ou bloquent l’apprentissage pour des organismes différents. Les implications de ces
résultats pour la théorie et la pratique sont discutées.
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resumen
El Aprendizaje en las Organizaciones Gubernamentales
Internacionales: El Caso de la Protección Social
Existen muchas investigaciones sobre la manera en que los encargados de la política
nacional aprenden del exterior. La mayoría de estas investigaciones se centran en los
procesos y los protagonistas que trabajan a nivel internacional. En ese hilo, poca atención
ha sido prestado a las organizaciones gubernamentales internacionales (las OGI), aparte
del ‘método abierto de coordinación’ de la UE. En el presente documento, se realiza un
estudio comparativo sobre el aprendizaje en tres OGI: la UE, la OCDE y el Consejo de
Ministros Nórdico. Nuestra área de política es la protección social. Se examina lo que
está siendo aprendido, y los factores que promueven o impiden el aprendizaje. Nuestra
metodología supone un análisis del diseño formal de esas OGI e incluye entrevistas cara-
a-cara con burócratas de alta jerarquía en cada organización. Se observa, en primer lugar,
que el aprendizajemás importante en lasOGI concierne los asuntos que no forman parte
de las agendas formales – la gobernabilidad y los asuntos epistémicos sobre todo. En
segundo lugar se observa que son muy distintos los factores que promueven o impiden
el aprendizaje en diferentes organizaciones. Se reflexiona sobre las consecuencias de
estas conclusiones tanto para la teoría como para la práctica.
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